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Abstract 
We examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if 
some participants are couples who express their preferences over pairs of the other participants. 
This generalization has applications to the National Resident Matching Program. 
Kq,~~or&: Stable marriage; Stable matching 
1. Introduction 
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is a voluntary centralized match- 
ing service that assigns graduating medical students to hospital residency positions. The 
program was implemented in 1951 and today attempts to fill over 20 000 positions a 
year [6]. The algorithm the NRMP uses was developed without the benefit of formal 
mathematical analysis; however its longevity and high usage rate attest to the sound- 
ncss of the algorithm. Ten years later, without any knowledge of the NRMP, Gale and 
Shapley [2] developed an equivalent algorithm in a different context. Over 10 years 
would pass before the mathematicians and the NRMP learned of each other’s work. 
Apparently, the success of the NRMP algorithm is due to the fact that they find what 
mathematicians call a stable matching [6]. 
An instance of the stable matching problem consists of two disjoint sets of partic- 
ipants to be matched (in our case a set of students and a set of hospital residency 
positions) and a ranking of some of the participants in the opposite set by each par- 
ticipant. If student S does not rank the position offered by hospital H or hospital H 
does not rank student S, then assigning S to H is an unacceptable assignment. A set 
of acceptable assignments is a stable matching if no student and hospital prefer each 
other to their assignment. Clearly, if a student and hospital prefer each other to their 
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assignment they would have an incentive to drop their assignments made by the NRMP 
in favor of each other. 
Since Gale and Shapley’s work, the stable matching problem has received a lot of 
attention [3,4,7]. Gale and Shapley’s algorithm showed that there is always a stable 
matching for any preference list. Moreover, there is a stable matching A4 that is hos- 
pital (student) optimal in the sense that every hospital (student) is at least as well 
off under M as it is under any other stable matching [2]. Unfortunately, the hospi- 
tal optimal matching is student pessimal in the sense that no student is worse off in 
any other stable matching than the student is in the hospital optimal matching. Simi- 
larly, the student optimal matching is hospital pessimal. The original NRMP algorithm 
yielded the hospital optimal stable matching. Additionally, if the hospital and student’s 
preference lists do not include all possible assignments (some assignments are deemed 
unacceptable) the sets of positions unfilled and of students unassigned is the same in 
all stable matchings [5]. 
Despite being student pessimal, the original NRMP algorithm served individual stu- 
dents well. Unfortunately, couples desiring residency positions near each other were not 
served well. Couples who desired residency positions together were forced to choose 
between not using the centralized service and being matching under a special couples 
algorithm. Students who were part of a couple submitted individual preference lists, an 
indication of which pairs of positions they considered to be together, and an indication 
of which partner was the primary partner. Students who were part of a couple were 
matched in the same way as singles by the algorithm except that they were allowed to 
hold more than one position. At the conclusion of the singles portion of the algorithm, 
the couple was assigned the best pair of assignments from their lists of positions held. 
When decisions were made among pairs of assignments, the primary partner’s prefer- 
ence was the one chosen. The assignment resulting from the couple’s algorithm may not 
reflect the couple’s true preferences [l]. In 1983 the NRMP modified its algorithm to 
allow couples to submit preferences over pairs of residency positions. Unfortunately, 
many of the appealing mathematical results for the stable matching problem do not 
carry over to the case where couples express preferences over pairs of positions (the 
couples problem). 
2. Differences between the marriage problem and the couples problem 
Theorem 1 (Roth [5]). There are instances of the couples problem that do not have 
a stable matching. 
Theorem 2. Even ifan instance of the couples problem has a stable matching, it may 
not have a hospital optimal or student optimal stable matching. 
Theorem 3. Consider an instance of the couples problem in which the preference lists 
are not complete. There may be stable matchings which leave diflerent numbers of 
positions unjilled. 
B. Aldershol; 0. M. Carduccil Discrete .4pplied Mathemutics 68 (19%) 203-207 205 
Are these results important to the NRMP? If the success of the NRMP is due to their 
finding a stable matching, Theorem 1 is potentially troublesome. However, the NRMP 
has been checking its assignments for stability since the late 1970s and, according to 
Elliott Peranson of National Matching Services, every NRMP match since then has 
been stable. Superficially, Theorem 2 may appear to be good news for the NRMP 
who have been criticized for finding the hospital optimal stable matching (see [8] ). 
However. it is no longer clear what criteria the NRMP is using to choose among 
stable matchings. Theorem 3 may pose even greater problems for the NRMP. The 
choice of stable matching may affect which students are assigned positions and which 
positions are filled. 
Proof of Theorems 2 and 3. Consider the instance of the couples problem with two 
couples (Si, &) and (Ss, &), four residency positions hl, hz, h3, and hd and the pref- 
erence lists given in Table 1. We use u to represent “unassigned”. (The most preferred 
assignment is listed first.) 
To show that the stable matchings of this example have the properties described 
in Theorems 2 and 3, we will consider all possible assignments. Clearly, we need not 
consider any assignment that leaves a student and position unassigned that have ranked 
each other. The list of possible assignments in Table 2 was generated by listing the 
permutations of the students in lexicographical order, inserting u for any assignments of 
unranked students to positions, and deleting all those that leave a student and position 
unassigned when they have ranked each other. 
Clearly, stable #l fills all positions and stable #2 leaves position 4 and student 1 
unassigned. Also since h2 and hi prefer stable #l. while h3 prefers stable #2 (11, is 
indifferent) neither stable #1 nor stable #2 is hospital optimal. Similarly, couple (Si, 5’: ) 
prefers stable #I while couple (&,Sd) prefers stable #2 so neither stable matching is 
student optimal either. We assume that given the choice a centralized matching service 
would choose stable ## 1. 0 
The proof of Theorems 2 and 3 provides an example of a couples problem with 
incomplete preference lists. There are also examples of couples problems with complete 
preference lists that have stable matchings, but that have no student or hospital optimal 
Table I 
Preference lists 
h3 114 CSI 1 s2 ) (S3.G) 
S2 s2 (h3. hz ) (hz.h, ) 
s4 s3 (h2.h)) Ch2.h3) 
St (h2.h) (hl.h3) 
(h3>h4) (h4. hl ) 
(u,h3) (h. 113 1 
Cu. h2 ) 
(u.h4) 
(h3.u) 
(h2. u) 
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Table 2 
Possible assignments 
h h 
u s2 
u s3 
Sl 
:3 Sl 
s3 SI 
& s2 
s3 s2 
s3 u 
s4 SI 
s4 SI 
s4 s2 
s4 SJ 
s4 s3 
h3 
s4 
s4 
s4 
s2 
s4 
SI 
s4 
SI 
s2 
f I 
Sl 
s2 
h4 
s3 
s2 
s3 
u 
s2 
u 
;2 
s3 
S2 
s3 
S2 
u 
Unstable 
pair 
(hl,&) 
(hl,%) 
(hl.&) 
((h2.hl)> G3.S4)) 
(h2.S3) 
(h3.G) 
(h3>&) 
(h2.G) 
(h2.S3) 
(hz,&) 
Stable # 1 
(hz.&) 
Stable # 2 
stable matching. In other words, Theorem 2 holds even if all preference lists are 
complete. 
3. Conclusion 
Allowing couples to express preferences over pairs of positions has improved the 
usefulness of the NRMP to couples at the cost of some certainty in the results. Par- 
ticularly troublesome is the possibility of different stable matchings yielding different 
sets of positions filled and of students assigned. 
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